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Abstract  
This paper develops a model of an open economy containing both sectors in which wages are 
market-determined and sectors with wage-setting arrangements. A portion of the latter group of 
sectors coordinate their wages, taking into account that their collective actions influence the 
equilibrium inflation outcome in an environment in which the central bank engages in 
discretionary monetary policymaking. Key predictions forthcoming from this model are (1) 
increased centralization of wage setting initially causes inflation to increase at low degrees of 
wage centralization but then, as wage centralization increases, results in an inflation dropoff; (2) 
a greater degree of centralized wage setting reduces the inflation-restraining effect of greater 
central bank independence; and (3) increased openness is more likely to reduce inflation in 
nations with less centralized wage bargaining. Analysis of data for seventeen nations for the 
period 1970-1999 provides generally strong and robust empirical support for all three of these 
predictions. 
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OPENNESS, CENTRALIZED WAGE BARGAINING, AND INFLATION 
 
1.  Introduction 
Early work by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) sought to understand the role of 
structural heterogeneities as key factors explaining cross-country variations in 
macroeconomic performance and in the effects of macroeconomic policies.  Recently 
there has been a reemerging interest in this topic.  Much of this interest has arisen in 
the political economy literature [see, for instance, Iversen, Pontusson, and Soskice 
(2000), and Franzese (2001, 2002, 2004), where considerable attention has been 
focused on the interaction among wage-bargaining centralization, central bank 
independence, and inflation performance [specific examples are Iverson (1998, 1999a), 
Franzese (2001), and Franzese and Hall (1998)].   
There is, of course, a burgeoning literature in economics concerning the 
macroeconomic implications of central bank independence.  Only a segment of this 
body of work, however, has examined the interplay between centralized wage-
bargaining structures and the equilibrium inflation rate under monetary policy discretion.  
Nevertheless, important contributions by Cubitt (1992, 1995) and Skott (1997) have 
showed that centralization of wage bargaining can significantly influence the optimal 
policy choices of a central bank.  Following up on this work, Soskice and Iversen (2000), 
Iversen (1999b), McHugh (2002), Guzzo and Velasco (1999), and Cukierman and Lippi 
(1999) have developed alternative frameworks for exploring the implications of 
increased wage-setting centralization for various macroeconomic variables, including 
inflation.  Soskice and Iversen emphasize how real wage adjustments can induce wage 
setters to accept lower nominal wages in exchange for increased employment, thereby 
providing a channel by which centralized wage bargaining can influence monetary 
policymaking and through which policymaking can, in turn, affect negotiated wages, 
employment, and output.  Iversen (1999b) develops a simple extension of the Barro-
  
Gordon framework that predicts a nonmonotic, hump-shaped relationship between 
inflation and the degree of centralized wage bargaining and provides empirical support 
for this hypothesis.  McHugh, who uses a model of imperfect competition in product 
markets as a means of analysis and examines only extreme labor-market structures 
(completely decentralized wage bargaining or fully centralized wage setting), reaches 
the conclusion that greater wage-bargaining centralization unambiguously raises 
inflation.   
The effects of increased central bank conservatism are the main focus of Guzzo 
and Velasco.  In contrast to McHugh, Guzzo and Velasco follow Skott by employing a 
multi-union model.  They find that increased central bank conservatism initially tends to 
reduce inflation but ultimately may lead to higher inflation if the wage-bargaining 
process is sufficiently centralized.  This implies that in a highly centralized wage-setting 
environment, society might be better off with a less conservative central bank.   
Like Guzzo and Velasco and Iversen (1999b), Cukierman and Lippi develop a theory of 
competing unions in which the degree of centralization can vary with the number of 
unions involved in wage coordination.  Their model implies that there are two ways in 
which increased centralization of wage bargaining can have macroeconomic effects.  
One is a strategic effect of greater centralization, in which coordinating unions recognize 
the inflation-moderating effects of lower wages.  Another is a competition effect, in 
which greater centralization of wage bargaining causes each union in the coordinating 
group to internalize the tendency of the central bank to respond to wage-bargaining 
centralization by reducing money growth, thereby reducing the incentive of unions to 
restrain their coordinated wage demands.  The interaction between these effects leads 
to a hump-shaped relationship between the centralization of wage bargaining and 
inflation, with inflation initially rising with greater centralization and then declining.  In 
addition, greater central bank independence typically reduces inflation, but at higher 
degrees of centralized wage setting this effect is reduced (and possibly reversed), 
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because in the face inflation-reducing effect of increased central bank conservatism 
unions have less incentive to restrain wage growth.     
A common feature of all these analyses is that they examine closed economies 
with firms operating in labor markets populated only by wage-setting unions.  In reality, 
of course, many nations have a mix of wage-setting arrangements, including the setting 
of nominal wages by some agents without regard to the macroeconomic effects of their 
decisions and by others who recognize that their collective wage decision can have 
macroeconomic consequences.  This paper departs from earlier work by including all 
three labor-market structures within a single framework:  an open economy containing 
firms without wage contracts, workers that do not coordinate wage-setting activities, and 
firms employing workers that collectively establish a common nominal wage.   The 
paper uses this framework to evaluate the implications of openness for the relationship 
between the extent of centralization of wage bargaining and inflation.   
Three key predictions emerge from our analysis.  First, as in Guzzo and Velasco, 
Iversen (1999b), and Cukierman and Lippi, inflation initially rises with increased 
centralization of wage bargaining but then declines.  Second, and also in accord with 
these authors’ conclusions, the inflation-restraining effect of increased central bank 
conservatism is reduced by a greater extent of centralized wage setting.  Although 
these two conclusions echo the implications of these authors’ analyses, they emerge 
from a very different approach in which firms employing workers without nominal wage 
contracts and firms bargaining with workers with and without centralized wage-
bargaining arrangements all inhabit the economic environment.  Third, our model 
implies that a greater degree of openness is more likely to reduce inflation in nations 
with less centralized wage bargaining.  When the wage-setting process is more 
centralized, increased openness can be associated with higher inflation, ceteris paribus.  
Hence, our model provides a broader indication of the range of interactions among 
fundamental institutional characteristics—centralization of wage setting, central bank 
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independence, and openness—in the determination of national inflation performances, 
which contrast to some extent with some of the previous literature examining the nature 
of these interactions (see, for instance, Franzese, 2002). 
The next section presents our model.  Section 3 uses a closed-economy version 
of this framework to illustrate how equilibrium inflation varies with the economy’s overall 
degree of wage centralization, as measured by the portion of firms with workers with 
wage contracts that participate in the joint coordination of wage setting.  In section 4, we 
show that there are contrasting channels by which increased openness influences the 
relationship between inflation and the centralization of wage bargaining.  Section 5 
assesses the empirical implications of our analysis and evaluates the evidence.  Section 
6 summarizes our conclusions. 
 
2.  An Open Economy with and without Coordinated Wage Setting 
 The theoretical framework is based in part on a limiting case of perfectly 
competitive product markets in the model developed in Daniels and VanHoose 
(Forthcoming).1  There are many atomistic firms in the economy, indexed i, which are 
distributed uniformly along a unit interval.  A fraction, Ω, of firms have workforces that 
contractually set nominal wages in advance of labor-market clearing.  Spot labor 
markets determine nominal wages in the portion of firms, 1-Ω, that do not have such 
contracts.  In a closed-economy version of this basic framework, Duca and VanHoose 
(2001) show that if risk-neutral firms and risk-averse workers face common aggregate 
shocks and heterogeneously distributed firm-specific disturbances, the contract share of 
firms Ω  typically lies between zero and unity but declines as the variability of firm-
specific disturbances increases relative to the volatility of aggregate shocks.  To 
maintain tractability, we abstract from considerations of disturbances that influence the 
endogenous determination of the share of firms with nominal wage contract.  We also 
abstract from a number of microeconomic factors—both institutional and structural—that 
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undoubtedly also influence the magnitude of Ω.  Consequently, we treat this proportion 
as an exogenous parameter.  This has the potential to limit the applicability of our 
analysis over a horizon sufficiently long that Ω  might vary endogenously. 
The output produced by a given firm i is given by 
 
(1) yi = αli , 
 
where yi is the log of output and li is the log of employment at firm i.  In principle, we 
could also include a productivity shock, but in the present context we simplify by 
excluding explicit consideration of such shocks from the analysis.  
 The domestic nation’s income-expenditure equilibrium condition (for a derivation 
of this Cobb-Douglas approximation, see, for instance, Canzoneri and Henderson, 
1991, or Bryson, et. al., 1993) is given by 
 
(2) y = η(p* + s - p) + (1-β)y + βy*; 
 
where y ≡  is the log of aggregate domestic output; p ≡1
0∫ diy i 10∫ dip i  is the log of the 
aggregate domestic price level; the average propensity to import, β, is a fraction; η is 
the elasticity of desired spending with respect to the real exchange rate; p* is the log of 
the aggregate foreign price level; s is the log of the domestic currency price of foreign 
currency; and y* is the log of aggregate foreign output.  Purchasing power parity does 
not necessarily hold at any point in time, but we assume agents anticipate that 
purchasing power parity does hold on average, so that  p*e + se – pe = 0, where the 
superscript e denotes the conditional expectation of a variable given information 
available in the previous period.  Specifying analogous structural relationships for a 
foreign nation would yield a two-country framework in which y* and p* would be 
endogenous variables.  In this paper, however, we assume the output and prices 
abroad are exogenously determined.  Henceforth we simplify the exposition by 
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assuming that the foreign money stock, foreign price level, and foreign output equal 
unity, so that p* and y* equal zero.   
Domestic income is determined by the quantity equation,   
 
(3) y = m – p, 
 
where m is the log of the money stock.  We simplify by normalizing velocity at unity, so 
that the log of velocity equals zero.  Consequently, the monetary authority ultimately 
determines the price level, and hence inflation, through its choice of m.   
 Using (1) in the profit function, PiYi – WiLi , yields the labor demand function for a 
firm i (with the intercept suppressed because it plays no role in our subsequent 
analysis): 
 
α 
- ( )(4)      =  ,
1
d
i
i  w - pl
 - 
 
 
where wi is the log of the nominal wage for the firm.   
Workers can consume both domestically produced output and foreign-produced 
goods.  Consequently, labor supply to firms depends on the real wage computed in 
terms of the overall price workers pay for a basket of both domestic and foreign goods: 
 
(5) lis = λ[wi – (1-β)p – βs], 
 
where λ > 0.  For firms with or without nominal wage contracts, the full-information, 
market-clearing wage satisfies (4) and (5) simultaneously and equals 
 
(
[ ]
λ α λ α β
λ α
[  (1  )+ 1] +  (1 ) )(6)        .
 (1- ) + 1
^
 i
- p - s - pw =  
 
This is the wage actually paid by firm i if it is among the share, 1-Ω, of firms without 
nominal wage contracts.  Substitution of (6) into either (4) or (5) and the result into (1) 
yields output of a noncontract firm with market-clearing (mc) wages:   
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(
[ ]
αλ
λ α 
) (7)     = -  .
(1- ) + 1
mc
i
β s - py
 
 
 
Thus, output of a firm without wage contracts responds negatively to a real depreciation 
of the home currency, because this reduces the purchasing power of workers’ wages 
and thereby generates a ceteris paribus decline in labor supply and hence a decline in 
spot-market employment at noncontract firms.2
Wage setters at the fraction of firms with nominal wage contracts, Ω, set nominal 
wages to minimize the expected value of the loss function, 
 
2
21
2 2
w
i
b
l π⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
(8)        ,
^
w
ii L  = l  
 
where  is the market-clearing, full-information employment level, which is equal to zero 
in this simplified model, π is inflation, and b
^
il
w is the relative weight that workers using 
nominal wage contracts place on the inflation objective relative to the employment 
objective.  As an analytical simplification, we define π ≡ p – p-1 and normalize last 
period’s price level at zero, so that π = p.3   
As in Cubitt (1992, 1995), Skott (1997), Cukierman and Lippi (1999), we consider 
a setting in which firms and members of society who supply labor seek to minimize 
perceived employment and inflation losses   Consequently, we assume that wage 
setters care about inflation losses separately because of associated menu and various 
other costs (see Modigliani and Fischer, 1986; and Fischer, 1986).  In addition, it is 
commonplace in this literature—and we follow the literature in this regard below—to 
consider policymaking, and presumably societal, loss functions that incorporate 
differential concerns about employment and output versus inflation.  In our model, wage 
setters are the main agents of society, hence we assume that concerns about inflation 
losses separate from inflation losses matter to them as well as to policymakers.   
The loss-minimizing condition is 
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(9)    
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂+⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
E  =i i w
i i
l pl b p
w w
 0. 
 
A fraction φ of contract firms (which are a fraction φΩ of all firms in the economy) 
coordinate their wage-setting activities.  Workers at a firm among the fraction 1- φ that 
do not coordinate [which are a fraction (1-φ)Ω of all firms] recognize that firm-level wage 
decisions cannot influence the price level, so that ∂∂ i
p
w
= 0 .  Solving (9) thereby yields 
the contracted nominal wage at a noncoordinating (nc) firm equal to   
Substituting the expectation of (6) into (4) and the result into (1) yields output of a firm 
with a noncoordinated wage contract, 
*e^
nc e
iiw w p =  = .
 
,α α  
( )(10)  = 
(1- )
nc
i
ep - py  
 which responds positively to unanticipated changes in the price level.   
At firms with wage setters that cooperatively determine nominal wages, the 
contract wage at every firm is set at a common level wc.  Output of a firm among this set 
with coordinating wage setters is thereby equal to 
 
,α α   
( )(11)  = 
(1- )
c
i
cp - wy  
 
so that output of the firm naturally increases if the price level grows at a faster pace than 
the coordinated wage rate.   From (9) and the fact that for a firm with coordinating wage 
setters employment is α 
( = 
(1- )
c
i
c )p - wl , this wage rate satisfies 
 
(12) 
1
α ∂∂
∂− ∂
2
c
c
(1- )
 = - .          
e
e
u
c e
e
pb p
ww p
p
w
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The wage choice of a group of coordinating wage setters can influence the aggregate 
price level, so this group sets its wage under the recognition that ∂∂ nci
p
w
is generally 
nonzero.  Thus, as is standard in the literature noted in the Introduction, coordinating 
wage setters take into account the anticipated price-level effects of their collective wage 
choice, given by ∂∂
e
c
i
p
w
, when determining their common contract wage.  To proceed in 
solving the model, therefore, we must determine the relationship between the aggregate 
price level and the collective wage decision of coordinating wage setters. 
 
3.  Wage-Setting Coordination and Inflation in a Closed Economy 
 To understand the basic workings and implications of the model, it is useful, in 
light of the additional complexities that openness creates, to begin with a closed-
economy version of the framework.  This is the case in which β = 0.  Firms behave 
identically, so that for all i ∈ [0, φΩ], c ciy  = y  nc nciy  = y  for all i ∈ [φΩ, Ω ], and 
for all i ∈ (Ω, 1].  It follows that y = φΩ ymc mciy  = y  c + (1-φ)Ωync + (1-Ω) ymc, where (7) 
implies that when β = 0, there is no real-exchange-rate effect on output at noncontract 
firms, so that ymc = 0.  Equations (10), and (11) then imply that the aggregate supply 
relationship in the closed-economy version of the model is given by 
 
.φΩα φ Ωαα
c ep - w p - py   ( )+(1- ) ((13)  = 
(1- )
)  
 
Equalizing (13) and the aggregate demand expression in (3) thereby yields the 
aggregate price level in terms of the common wage set via coordinating bargaining: 
 
(
αφΩ α φ Ω α
α Ω
c e
c w p  mp w  + (1- ) + (1- )  (14)    ( ) =  .
[1- 1-  ) ]
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This implies that 
(
αφΩ
α φ Ω
∂
∂ ci
p
w
 =  .  
{1- [1- 1- )   ]}
The effect of establishment of a higher 
wage by coordinating wage setters on the aggregate price level is positive, because 
such a wage boost places upward pressure on the equilibrium price level.  Coordinating 
wage setters will anticipate this effect when establishing their collective nominal wage, 
and equation (12) thereby indicates that the contract wage they establish is given by 
 
(
wbαφΩ α
α φ Ω
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
c ew  p
2(1- )  
(15)    = 1 - .
{1- [1- 1- )   ]}
 
 
Hence, if φΩ is nonzero, so that workers at a portion of firms coordinate setting their 
nominal wages, and bw > 0, so that wage setters place a positive loss weight on 
inflation, the contracted nominal wage established at the share of firms with coordinated 
bargaining will be a markdown from the anticipated price level.  This is so because the 
coordinating wage setters will recognize that a higher collective wage will have 
inflationary consequences, which they reduce by holding down their common contracted 
wage.  In addition to restraining the price level, this has the effect of boosting 
employment above the full-information, market-clearing level.   
 Substituting (15) into (14) yields the equilibrium price level in terms of the money 
stock and the expected price level: 
 
2 2( { (
( (
α α φ Ω αΩ α φ Ω α α φ Ω
α Ω α φ Ω
2+ ewm bp 
2(1- ){1- [1- 1- )   ]} {1- [1- 1- )   ]} - (1- ) }  (16)    =  .
[1- 1-  ) ]{1- [1- 1- )   ]}
p
 
 
Substitution of (15) and (16) into (13) then produces an expression for aggregate output 
in terms of the money stock and the expected price level, given by 
 
2 2( (
( (
αΩ α φ Ω αΩ α φ Ω α α φ Ω
α Ω α φ Ω
2 e
wm by 
2{1- [1- 1- )   ]} - { {1- [1- 1- )   ]} - (1- ) }  (17)    =  .
[1- 1-  ) ]{1- [1- 1- )   ]}
p
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Naturally, (17) implies that the model also has implications for real output, as in Soskice 
and Iversen (2000), but in this paper we focus solely on examining its inflation 
predictions. 
Following Barro and Gordon, we consider a Nash game among the central bank 
and wage setters in which the central bank seeks to minimize the policy loss function, 
 
(18) L = E [(y - - K)
^
y 2 + bcbπ2], 
 
where  is full-information economy-wide output under market clearing, which equals 
zero, K is an output distortion, and b
^
y
cb is the relative weight that the central bank places 
on the inflation component of its loss function.  As in the basic analysis of Barro and 
Gordon (1983), for K = 0, a zero-inflation policy minimizes the central bank’s loss.  In 
general, however, K > 0, and because agents make ex ante choices without complete 
information, a zero-inflation monetary policy is time-inconsistent.  In many versions of 
this Barro-Gordon-style framework, a common assumption is that the inflation rate is a 
choice variable for the central bank.  In this model, however, the central bank 
determines the money stock.  Once the money stock is determined, the equilibrium 
inflation rate, which with p-1 = 0 is equivalent to the price level, adjusts endogenously to 
the money stock and agents’ expectation of the price level.  Hence, the central bank 
alters the conditions under which wage setters bargain, thereby influencing their wage 
choices and, ultimately, the price level and real output. 
Using (16) and (17) in (18) and minimizing with respect to m, with the expected 
price level taken as given, yields a lengthy expression for the money stock in terms of 
the expected price level.   Equation (16), however, implies that ex post the expected 
price level is equal to 
 
2 2
(
(
α φ Ω
α φ Ω α α φ Ω 2
e
e
w
mp  
b
{1- [1- 1- )   ]}(19)    =  .
{1- [1- 1- )   ]} - (1- )
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Note that as long as φ > 0 and bw > 0, the expected price level does not rise 
equiproportionately with agents’ anticipation of expected money growth, because 
agents recognize the inflation-restraining effect of coordinating wage setters’ incentives 
to hold back on nominal wage boosts.  Finally, substituting (19) into the decision rule for 
the central bank’s optimal money stock choice yields the average price level, which 
since p-1 equals zero is the average inflation rate for the closed-economy version of the 
model: 
 
 
( )3 2
(
(
αΩ α φ Ωπ α α φ Ω α Ω φ3+cb w
K 
b b
{1- [1- 1- )   ]}(20)    =  .
(1- ) {1- [1- 1- )   ]}
 
 
Note that this solution indicates that if φ = 0, so that no wage setters coordinate 
their bargaining, or if bw = 0, so that wage setters place no loss weight on inflation, the 
equilibrium average inflation rate is αΩπ α cb
K 
b
= .
(1- )
   This is the standard Barro-Gordon 
inflation solution indicating that the magnitude of the inflation bias depends positively on 
the output distortion K and the terms of the output-inflation trade-off governed by the 
magnitude of the output elasticity parameter α, and negatively on the inflation weight of 
the central bank, all provided that Ω > 0, so that at least a portion of firms in the 
economy have nominal wage contracts creating nominal wage stickiness and, thus, a 
time inconsistency problem.   
 For φ > 0 and bw > 0, a portion of the economy is populated with inflation-averse 
wage setters that coordinate a common wage choice while recognizing the inflationary 
consequences of their collective decision.  This has a moderating effect on inflation that 
is increasing in the sizes of both φ and bw.  Thus, even though an increase in the overall 
share of the economy with contracted wages, Ω, tends to increase the scope of the 
economy’s time-inconsistency problem, this effect tends to be mitigated if a larger 
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portion of wage setters coordinate their bargaining by holding back on wage boosts to 
restrain their inflationary consequences. 
 The magnitude of the share φΩ  essentially measures the overall degree of 
centralization of the economy’s wage-bargaining process.  Figure 1 displays simulations 
of (20) under the simplifying assumption that bcb = bw = b.  In all three simulations 
shown in the figure, the average inflation rate initially increases as both φ and Ω rise but 
ultimately declines.  This implies a hump-shaped relationship between average inflation 
and the overall share of firms with coordinating wage setters.  Although we have, as in 
Cukierman and Lippi (1999), derived this relationship using a model of discretionary 
monetary policy, this conclusion accords with the Calmfors-Driffill argument that 
macroeconomic performance—here captured by effects on average inflation—worsens 
at intermediate degrees of centralization of wage bargaining but ultimately improves as 
the centralization of wage bargaining becomes more fully centralized.   
 
[Figure 1 Goes Here] 
 
 As in Barro and Gordon, a larger value of α raises the extent to which 
unexpected increases in inflation can boost output, which adds to the central bank’s 
incentive to boost the money stock and thereby increases average inflation for all values 
of φ and Ω.  Decreases in either bcb or, as long as φ > 0, bw act to increase the 
equilibrium inflation rate.  In this sense, the model supports Franzese’s (2002) 
conclusion that central bank independence and increased centralization of wage 
bargaining both have reinforcing inflation-restraining effects.  Equation (20) implies, 
however, if there is an increased aversion to inflation on the part of coordinating wage 
setters, so that bw increases in magnitude, a rise in the degree of central bank 
conservatism reflected by a larger value of bcb has a smaller effect on inflation.   
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Ceteris paribus, therefore, greater central bank conservatism in a nation with a 
larger extent of centralized wage bargaining will tend to reduce inflation less than in a 
country with a relatively larger share of firms that experience decentralized wage 
setting.  This conclusion is similar to the result in the analysis of Cukierman and Lippi 
but does not rely on a framework in which the entire labor force is unionized.  In 
addition, because our model includes firms that pay market-clearing wages and 
considers a loss function with an output objective, greater central bank independence 
unambiguously tends to reduce inflation.  Consequently, in contrast to Cukierman and 
Lippi, there is no reversal of the effect of central bank independence on inflation, in 
which an “ultra liberal” central bank that places no weight on inflation can emerge as a 
loss-minimizing outcome.  Even in the case in which φ = Ω = 1, so that workers at all 
firms contract and engage in coordinated wage setting, an “ultra liberal” central bank is 
consistent with a loss-minimizing outcome only in the special case in which α = 1.  In 
this special case, of course, output and employment are identical, and ex ante policy 
actions involving output loss minimization correspond to the employment-focused 
policymaking contemplated by Cukierman and Lippi. 
 
4.  Openness, Coordinated Wage Setting, and Inflation 
Our approach also allows for a consideration of the implications of openness for 
the relationship among centralization of wage bargaining, central bank independence, 
and inflation.  In an open economy, β > 0, and two channels are introduced into the 
analysis of the determination of equilibrium inflation in the presence of wage-setting 
coordination among a portion of firms in the economy.   First, the aggregate supply 
relationship that holds for an open economy becomes 
 
( ( .
(
α φ Ω α φ Ω Ω λβ
α φ Ω
φΩα φ Ωα
α
c ep - w p - p p - sy {1- [1- 1- )   ]} {1- [1- 1- )   ]} 1-  ) ( )   
{1- [1- 1- )   ]}
( )+(1- ) ( )+(13 )  = 
(1- )
' (  
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This solution implies that the sensitivity of output with respect to the price level along the 
aggregate supply relationship is increasing in the degree of openness, measured by the 
import propensity, β.  This is so because an increase in openness makes labor supply 
at noncontract firms relatively less sensitive to variations in the home price level, given 
the nominal exchange rate.  Consider the effect of a rise in the home price level:  Labor 
supply declines in response to the resulting fall in the real wage, and so employment 
and output decline.  This effect is diminished as the degree of openness rises, because 
greater openness reduces the sensitivity of labor supply with respect to the home price 
level.  Thus, equilibrium output is less sensitive to a change in the price level in a more 
opening economy, implying that the terms of the overall output-inflation relationship 
improve as the magnitude of β increases.   
At the same time, however, combining (2) and (3) indicates that in an income-
expenditure equilibrium for the home economy, ββ η
∂
∂ = ,-
p
m
 so that 
η
β β η
∂⎛ ⎞∂ ⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
∂ 2
- =  < 0.
( - )
p
m   This implies that the responsiveness of aggregate expenditures 
to a change in the money stock declines with increased openness, which reduces the 
extent which discretionary monetary policy can influence the price level in an effort to 
induce output expansions.  Together these two effects of increased openness tend to 
work against each other.  Daniels and VanHoose (Forthcoming) show that in an 
imperfect-competition generalization of this framework the reduced ability of the central 
bank to induce firms to raise prices, owing to the reduced pricing power available to 
firms as the degree of openness increases, can tend to dominate and produce lower 
average inflation, which for most nations is consistent with actual experience.   Thus, 
greater openness is most likely to cause a downward shift in the open-economy 
analogue to the relationship between openness and the degree of wage centralization 
depicted in Figure 1. 
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 The second channel arises from the fact that increased openness affects the 
incentives of coordinating wage setters.  Because the aggregate supply relationship is 
shallower in a more open economy, an increase in wages set via centralized wage 
bargaining has a smaller effect on the aggregate price level.  This, in turn, reduces the 
incentive for wage setters that coordinate their bargains to restrain their collective wage 
choice.  It can be shown that in the open-economy version of the model, the analogue 
to equation (15) is 
 
2(
.
( (
αφΩ α φ Ω η β α
η α φ Ω λ α β Ω λ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
c ewbw  p
2
2
{1- [1- 1- )   ]}( - )(1- )  (15 )    = 1 - 
{1- [1- 1- )   ]}[ (1- )+1] + 1-  )  
'  
 
This expression indicates that an increase in the propensity to import, β, unambiguously 
boosts the contracted wage for coordinating wage setters, implying that their optimal 
wage choice is increasing in the degree of openness.  This tends to boost equilibrium 
inflation in an economy containing wage-coordinating wage setters.4   
 In light of the contrasting effects of these two channels, solution of the open-
economy version of the model yields very unwieldy analytical expressions that imply an 
ambiguous overall effect of greater openness on the equilibrium inflation rate.  
Nevertheless, it is possible, from the perspective of Figure 1, to reason out the how the 
channels by which openness affects inflation vary in their effects depending on the 
degree of wage centralization in the economy.  At low degrees of wage centralization, 
greater openness is more likely to rotate the inflation-wage centralization relationship 
downward along the leftward portion of the relationship.  At higher degrees of wage 
centralization, along the rightward portion of the relationship, the tendency for 
coordinating wage setters to bargain for higher wages as the economy becomes more 
open yields an upward rotation.  Increased openness, therefore, is more likely to reduce 
inflation in nations with a relatively low extent of wage-bargaining centralization but is 
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more likely to raise inflation in countries with more centralized wage-setting 
arrangements.   
Our analysis has emphasized two channels by which the degree of openness 
influences the inflation-wage centralization relationship.  The first is the traditional 
channel arising from the structural macroeconomic effects of increased openness on 
the terms of the output-inflation trade-off (first proposed by Romer, 1993) and the price-
responsiveness of monetary policy actions (as discussed by Daniels and VanHoose, 
2004).  This channel tends to reduce equilibrium inflation in more open economies.  The 
second channel arises from the rational response of coordinating wage setters to the 
reduced effect of their common wage choice on the equilibrium price level in a more 
open economy, namely to relax their restraint of nominal wage growth, which 
contributes to higher equilibrium inflation.  The joint implication of these two channels by 
which greater openness affects inflation is that increased openness is more likely to be 
associated with lower inflation in nations with less centralized wage bargaining. 
 
5.  Empirical Implications and Evidence 
Three empirical implications emerge from the forgoing discussion: 
  i)  inflation initially rises when an increased share of firms have wage setters that 
coordinate their wage setting activities but then declines with ever-increasing 
centralization of wage bargaining; 
ii)   the inflation-restraining effect of increased central bank conservatism will be 
lessened under more centralized wage setting; and  
iii)  increased openness is more likely to reduce inflation in nations with less centralized 
wage bargaining. 
 
Testing these hypotheses requires an indicator of the degree to which collective 
bargaining activities are coordinated within individual nations.  A variety of authors, 
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including Iversen (1999a), Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (2002), OECD (1997), 
Cukierman and Lippi (1999), Calmfors et al. (2001) (based on Visser, 2000), and 
Kenworthy (2001), have attempted to construct such indicators.  Of these, Kenworthy’s 
provides a frequency of observations and covers a period of time consistent with the 
other macroeconomic data we analyze to examine determinants of inflation.  
Kenworthy’s (2001, pp. 2-3) index of wage-setting coordination consists of the following 
five categories:   
 
1 = Fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms or plants.  
 
2 = Mixed industry- and firm-level bargaining, with little or no pattern-setting and 
relatively weak elements of government coordination such as setting of basic pay 
rate or wage indexation.  
 
3 = Industry-level bargaining with somewhat irregular and uncertain pattern-setting 
and only moderate union concentration; government wage arbitration.  
 
4 = Centralized bargaining by peak confederation(s) or government imposition of a 
wage schedule/freeze, without a peace obligation; informal centralization of 
industry- and firm-level bargaining by peak associations; extensive, regularized 
pattern-setting coupled with a high degree of union concentration.  
 
5 = Centralized bargaining by peak confederation(s) or government imposition of a 
wage schedule/freeze, with a peace obligation; informal centralization of industry-
level bargaining by a powerful, monopolistic union confederation; extensive, 
regularized pattern-setting and highly synchronized bargaining coupled with 
coordination of bargaining by influential large firms.  
 
In light of the facts that the centralization index is completely discrete and that no 
theoretical prior exists as to exactly where the peak of the hump-shaped inflation-
centralization relationship should be located, we follow the procedure suggested by 
Cukierman and Lippi (1999) by using five dummy variables (CORD1, CORD2, …, 
CORD5) to represent these categories.5   
The other variables used in our empirical model for testing our three hypotheses 
are as follows:6  
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(1) the inflation rate (INF), which is based on the GDP deflator using data from  the IMF 
International Financial Statistics;  
(2) the degree of central bank independence (CBI), taken from Franzese (2002), which 
is a weighted average of legal independence, a characterization of independence 
based on answers to a survey completed by individual at central banks 
(Cukierman, 1992), economic independence, political independence (Grilli, et al., 
1991), and Bade and Parkin’s (1982) index of central bank independence; and  
(3) openness expressed as the ratio of imports to GDP using data from Ghosh et al. 
(2002). 
 
 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics on the sample data.  Table 2 reports the 
estimation results based on an annual sample of 17 countries covering the period, 
1970-1999.7  All regressions are estimated using OLS with the standard errors 
corrected for serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure. 
The first column contains the results from a base specification that does not 
control for the degrees of openness and central bank independence.   The estimated 
coefficients on the five dummy variables representing the degrees of wage 
centralization (CORD1, CORD2, CORD3, CORD4, and CORD5) are individually and 
jointly significant (F = 8.41, p-value = 0.00).  Moreover, these estimates form a humped-
shaped pattern.  The estimates rise from an initial value of 5.14 (CORD1 = fragmented 
wage bargaining,) reaching a peak of 7.56 (CORD3  = industry-level bargaining with 
somewhat irregular and uncertain pattern-setting and only moderate union 
concentration; government wage arbitration.  They end with an estimated value of 6.48 
(CORD5 = centralized bargaining coupled with coordination of bargaining by influential 
large firms), which is larger than the estimate corresponding to CORD4 but lower than 
the peak value at CORD3.    
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The empirical specification reported in the second column of Table 2 adds 
openness to the measures of wage bargaining coordination.  The coefficient estimate 
for this additional new variable has the expected negative sign and is statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  Furthermore, the estimated parameters associated with the 
five centralization dummy variables follow the same general humped-shaped pattern as 
in the regression without inclusion of openness (column 1). 
The regression equation in the third column of Table 2 replaces openness with 
central bank independence (CBI), which the basic theoretical framework indicates 
should also play a fundamental role in influencing inflation.  This specification yields 
results that are generally consistent with those in the preceding columns, and the 
adjusted coefficient of determination is somewhat larger (69% versus 66%).8  
In the specification reported in the fourth column, therefore, we include both 
openness and CBI, in addition to the five dummy variables representing the structure of 
wage bargaining.  Once again, the results are in general conformity with those in earlier 
models.  The adjusted R2 from this regression is marginally greater than that of the 
model with CBI but without openness. 
In order to test our second and third hypotheses regarding the effects of CBI and 
openness, the empirical specification reported in the fifth column of Table 2 includes an 
interaction of openness and CBI with wage-setting coordination.  In contrast to the 
previous regressions that specified the five categories of wage bargaining centralization 
in terms of dummy variables, these additional explanatory variables in the final 
regression model interact the actual value of Kenworthy’s discrete index with openness 
and CBI to test our second and third hypotheses.9
Note that the estimated coefficients on the five coordination dummy variables 
reported in the last column of Table 2, which are individually and jointly significant, no 
longer form a pattern that is fully consist with Figure 1, thereby failing to support the first 
hypothesis that inflation initially rises with increased wags setting coordination and then 
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declines as the centralization of wage bargaining continues to rise.10  Nevertheless, as 
in the earlier specifications, the estimated coefficients on openness and CBI have the 
expected negative sign and are statistically significant.   
According to the second and third theoretical hypotheses, the two interaction 
terms should have positive coefficients.  The estimated coefficients for the interaction 
terms added in the final regression are indeed positive and statistically significant, which 
provides support for these predictions.  Thus, the data indicate that, consistent with our 
theoretical analysis, the inflation-restraining effect of increased central bank 
independence is diminished under more centralized wage setting, and increased 
openness reduces inflation under less centralized wage bargaining.11
 Except for the fifth regression, the results in Table 2 are consistent with those 
reported by Iversen (1999b, P. 250, Table 2).  It is reassuring that even though both 
Iversen’s study and our analysis use different samples and different measures of CBI 
and wage-setting coordination, they still arrive at the same overall conclusion regarding 
the humped-shape of the inflation-coordination relationship and the effect of CBI on this 
relationship.  Our study additionally considers the interaction between the degree of 
openness of the economy and the extent of collective bargaining coordination. 
We examined the robustness of our results in a number of ways.  First, we 
estimated the broadest model in Table 2 (regression 5) using actual values of 
Kenworthy’s indicator of wage-setting coordination and its squared value instead of the 
five dummy variables representing the five categories of the indicator.   The results did 
not fully support the hypothesized humped-shape of the effect of coordination on 
inflation.  The squared estimated coefficient on the squared of the coordination index 
had the expected negative sign and was statistically significant, while the coefficient 
estimate for the index itself was neither positive nor statistically significant.  The results 
using actual index values did, however, support our second and third hypotheses that 
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increased centralization of wage bargaining reduces the inflation-lowering effects of 
increased openness and central bank independence.   
 In addition, we replaced Franzese’s (2002) index of CBI with the legal index of 
central bank independence developed by Cukierman, et al. (1992) and Cukierman 
(1992), which ranges continuously between zero (least independent) to one (most 
independent) to re-estimate the fifth regression in Table 2.  The fundamental empirical 
results did not seem to be sensitive to this change.   Interestingly, when we replace 
Franzese’s CBI index with the central bank turnover index (Ghosh et al. 2002), in all 
cases, including the broadest model in column 5 of Table 2, we found the hump-shaped 
pattern of wage-setting coordination, although there was a loss of statistical significance 
for some of the estimates.  This means that the results may not be entirely robust to the 
selected measure of central bank independence. 
We also incorporated some of the recent developments relating to the 
relationship between openness and inflation.  As documented by Levin and Piger (2002) 
and Ihrig and Marquez (2003), time series inflation data exhibit a break around the late 
1980s and early 1990s, and Bleaney (1999) notes that around the time of this same 
break the economic and statistical significance of the openness-inflation relationship 
began to diminish among developing nations.  To control for this we included a dummy 
variable for the period after 1988 and obtained results that were not markedly different 
from those reported in reported in the final specification in Table 2.  Furthermore, 
following Alfaro (2002) who noted that exchange-rate regimes influence the nature of 
the openness-inflation relationship, we incorporated indicators of pegged, intermediate, 
and floating rate regimes developed by Ghosh et al. (2002) both additively and 
multiplicatively as interactions with openness.  Once again, the results were robust to 
the inclusion of exchange rate regimes.12
To better understand the interaction terms in the regression model 5, we present 
the estimated marginal effect of central bank independence and the estimated marginal 
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effect of openness for the range of values of centralized wage coordination along the 
lines suggested by Kam and Franzese (2005).  We use CLARIFY (Tomz et al., 2001) to 
generate the simulated expected values of the marginal effect as described by King et 
al. (2001).  Following the estimation of regression model 5, we draw 1,000 simulations 
of the estimated model parameters from their asymptotic sampling distribution.  To 
generate the marginal effect of central bank independence for various values of wage 
coordination, all CORD dummies, openness, and the interactive term of openness and 
wage coordination are set at zero, and central bank independence is set equal to unity.  
This yields the marginal effect of CBI, d(Inflation)/d(CBI) = βCBI + βCBI•CordCord.  We then 
set Cord at a given value, say unity, and, using simulated parameters values, we 
generate the average expected value, standard error, and 95 percent confidence 
interval at each value of Cord.   
Simulated expected values and the confidence interval are presented in Figure 2.  
The marginal effect of CBI is negative and always bounded away from zero, indicating a 
significant negative marginal effect of central bank independence for all degrees of 
wage coordination.  (If extended to the vertical axis, in which case Cord would assume 
a value of zero, the intercept would equal the coefficient on CBI.)  The positive slope of 
the marginal effect depicted in Figure 2 shows that, consistent with our theoretical 
predictions, increased CBI reduce inflations less in countries with a relatively larger 
degree of centralized wage coordination relative.  The shape of the confidence interval 
illustrates a higher degree of certainty regarding the simulated expected values near the 
mean value of Cord and a lower degree of certainty moving away from the mean value. 
 
[Figure 2 Goes Here] 
 
Figure 3 displays the results when the same basic procedure is used to generate 
the marginal effect of openness on inflation for different degrees of centralized wage 
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coordination.  The marginal effect of openness on inflation also has a positive slope, 
indicating that increased openness tends to have a greater dampening effect on 
inflation in countries with lower levels of centralized wage coordination.  Consistent with 
the theoretical prediction that greater openness could potentially boost inflation under 
centralized wage bargaining, in Figure 3 the simulated mean marginal effect is positive 
at the highest level of Cord—though the confidence interval spans the horizontal axis, 
indicating uncertainty regarding this conclusion. 
 
[Figure 3 Goes Here] 
 
Finally, we repeated the basic approach reported in Table 2 by replacing 
Kenworthy’s index of wage-setting coordination with the net union density data reported 
by Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000).  These data best proxy for the overall share of 
unionization (Ω) in our theoretical model and thus do not fully capture the extent to 
which wage setting is centralized, but they allow us to consider an annual frequency, 
albeit only for twelve countries covering the years 1970-1992.  Using these data to test 
our first hypothesis concerning the pattern of the effect of unionization on inflation, we 
entered net union density both linearly and as a quadratic term in place of measures 
based on Kenworthy’s centralization index.  Our first hypothesis implies that the former 
should have a positive effect and the latter a negative effect.  Estimation results, which 
are reported in Table 3, support our theoretical predictions concerning the effect of 
union density on inflation once effects of central bank independence and/or openness 
are taken into account.  The results reported in Table 3 also support our theoretical 
hypotheses regarding the impacts of openness and CBI; the coefficient estimates for 
these variables are negative and statistically significant in all cases (Columns 2-5).  
Although the estimated coefficients on the two interaction terms are positive, consistent 
with our theory, the coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant.  Hence, to the 
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extent that net union densities provide an indication of overall unionization rates that 
might engender wage-setting coordination, using this measure provides at least partial 
support for concluding that the results reported in Table 2 provide robust implications 
concerning the relevance of our theoretical model. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper has offered two contributions to understanding the relationship 
between macroeconomic performance and the degree of centralization of wage 
bargaining.  First, it has developed a macroeconomic framework for analyzing this 
relationship that accounts for the types of labor-market heterogeneities encountered in 
real-world economies.  The model developed in this paper has permitted the evaluation 
of discretionary monetary policy choices in an environment incorporating wage 
determination in spot markets for labor, wage setting at individual firms, and coordinated 
wage determination by a group of wage setters.  In this setting, coordinating wage 
setters have an incentive to restrain nominal wage growth in light of their recognition 
that higher wages contribute to inflation.  What naturally emerges is this setting is a 
hypothesized hump-shaped relationship between equilibrium inflation and the extent to 
which wage bargaining is centralized among coordinating wage setters, along with the 
prediction that the inflation-restraining effect of increased central bank conservatism will 
be lessened under more centralized wage setting.  Furthermore, our framework implies 
that increased openness should tend to have a greater inflation-restraining impact in 
nations in which wage bargaining is less centralized. 
Empirical evaluation of data encompassing inflation, centralization of wage 
setting, openness and centralization for seventeen nations between 1970 and 1999 
provides considerable support for all three of these theoretical predictions.  These 
results are robust to consideration of the potential change in the inflation-openness 
relationship after 1988 and alternative exchange-rate regimes, and the theory also 
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receives qualified support from alternative empirical specifications in which net union 
densities are used as an imperfect proxy for the degree of wage centralization.   
 Our analysis, therefore, provides strong support for Cukierman and Lippi’s (1999) 
work extending the Calmfors-Driffill (1988) hypothesis regarding the relationship 
between centralized wage setting and inflation to encompass additional effects of 
central bank independence.  In contrast to Cukierman and Lippi, however, our 
theoretical framework does not hinge on the assumption that a nation’s entire workforce 
is unionized, and it also allows us to assess additional impacts resulting from a change 
in the degree of openness, which Romer (1993) has shown also explains cross-country 
inflation performances.  It thereby provides a broader indication of the range of 
interactions among fundamental structural characteristics—centralization of wage 
setting, central bank independence, and openness—in the determination of national 
inflation performances.   
Undoubtedly, such institutional features of a nation’s economy are explained by 
deeper characteristics that interact in a broad political-economy setting.  Thus, our 
analysis suggests more broadly that scholars might benefit from pursuing political-
economy approaches such as those suggested by Iversen (1999a), Calmfors, et. al. 
(2002), and Franzese (2002), perhaps by building on recent work on political economics 
summarized in Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).   
More narrowly, we see three ways that our analysis might be generalized in 
potentially fruitful ways.  Inclusion of firm-level and/or aggregate productivity, 
expenditure, and monetary disturbances that were explicitly ignored in the present 
paper would, for instance, permit consideration of implications of how openness 
influences both inflation volatility and the endogenous determination of both the extent 
to which wage contracts are utilized and the degree to which wage bargaining is 
centralized.  In addition, allowing for competitive imperfections in product markets would 
be a useful, albeit significantly complicating, extension, because allowing for product-
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market imperfections would considerably generalize and thereby render more realistic 
the range of actions by centralized wage setters who recognize that their choices 
influence the incentives faced by monetary policymakers.  Finally, relaxing the 
assumption of constant output and prices in the rest of the world and extending the 
model to a two- or multi-country setting would facilitate analysis of possible cross-border 
spillover effects of increased openness on interdependent monetary policies and 
inflation outcomes.  We leave consideration of these and other potentially interesting 
extensions to future research. 
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 Table 1
 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Inflation Coordination CBI Openness 
Mean 5.83 3 50.70 29.25 
Median 4.80 3 47.38 27.91 
St. Dev. 4.34 0.73 19.84 13.53 
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Table 2 
Alternative Estimates of Inflation 
Annual Panel of 17 Countries, 1970-1999 
(Absolute Values of t-Ratios based on Newey-West Robust  
Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cord1 5.14 
(10.76) 
5.75 
(9.66) 
9.04 
(10.60) 
10.24 
(9.87) 
19.10 
(7.33) 
Cord2 6.94 
(7.73) 
7.51 
(7.86) 
9.68 
(9.44) 
10.75 
(9.41) 
15.73 
(9.79) 
Cord3 7.56 
(9.52) 
8.42 
(8.81) 
9.98 
(11.33) 
11.48 
(10.08) 
14.86 
(11.43) 
Cord4 4.66 
(11.72) 
5.61 
(7.61) 
8.66 
(9.27) 
10.40 
(8.11) 
11.10 
(8.92) 
Cord5  6.48 
(14.45) 
7.34 
(9.12) 
 9.43 
(13.43) 
10.97 
(9.77) 
8.56 
(6.36) 
Openness 
 
 -0.03 
(1.63)*
 -0.04 
(2.35)**
-0.3 
(5.23) 
CBI 
 
  -0.07 
(5.66) 
-0.07  
(5.91) 
-0.17 
(4.04) 
Cord*Openness     0.06 
(4.23) 
Cord*CBI     0.02 
(2.37)**
Adjusted R2  0.662  0.664  0.687  0.692 0.703 
F Statistic 8.41  7.44 15.64 14.68 13.89 
Number of 
Observations 
510 510 510 510 510 
       *Significant at the 10% level 
       **Significant at the 5% level 
       All other estimates are significant at the 1% level 
Glossary 
Cord = index of wage-setting coordination (Kenworthy, 2001) 
Cord1 = dummy variable equals 1 for fragmented (decentralized) bargaining 
Cord2 = dummy variable equals 1 for mixed industry- and firm-level bargaining 
Cord3 = dummy variable equals 1 for industry-level bargaining and moderate     
 union concentration 
Cord4 = dummy variable equals 1 for centralized wage bargaining 
Cord5 = dummy variable equals 1 for centralized wage bargaining along with  
centralization of bargaining by influential firms 
Openness = ratio of imports to GDP 
CBI = index of central bank independence (Franzese, 2002) 
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Table 3 
Alternative Estimates of Inflation 
Annual Panel of 12 countries, 1970-1992 
(Absolute Values of t-Ratios based on Newey-West Robust  
Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 
 
2.71 
(1.63)*
4.29 
(2.70) 
8.59 
(4.63) 
9.61 
(5.25) 
11.37 
(3.62) 
Union 0.15 
(2.05)**
0.25 
(3.14) 
0.13 
(1.84)*
0.22 
(2.80) 
0.18 
(1.69)*
Union2 -0.001 
(1.54) 
-0.002 
(2.59) 
-0.001 
(1.84)*
-0.002 
(2.69) 
-0.002 
(2.67) 
Openness 
 
 -0.11 
(4.10) 
 -0.10 
(3.71) 
-0.16 
(2.54)**
CBI 
 
  -0.09 
(6.38) 
-0.08 
(6.69) 
-0.09  
(2.46)**
Union*Openness     0.13 
(1.01) 
Union*CBI     0.01 
(0.16 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.24  
F Statistic 6.71 13.07 21.01 22.51 15.10 
Sample Size 276 276 276 276 276 
       *Significant at the 10% level 
       **Significant at the 5% level 
       All other estimates are significant at the 1% level 
 
Glossary 
Union = net union density (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000)  
Openness = ratio of imports to GDP 
CBI = index of central bank independence (Franzese, 2002) 
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Figure 1  
Inflation Simulations 
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Figure 2
Marginal Effect of Central Bank 
Independence
by degree of centralized wage coordiantion
with 95% confidence interval
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Figure 3
Marginal Effect of Openness
by degree of centralized wage coordiantion
with 95% confidence interval
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FOOTNOTES 
                                                 
1  The assumption of perfect competition in product markets simplifies exposition and 
analysis of the model, which already becomes quite complex when openness is 
considered below.  As noted in the conclusion, generalizing to the case of imperfect 
competition in this framework would be a useful direction for future work, because in 
such a setting labor demand would become less sensitive to the product price, and 
wage setters are more likely to seek higher wages in the face of monopolistic 
exploitation in the labor market.   
2   Note that this implies that a potential exists for a conflict of interest among workers 
regarding real exchange rate movements, which might be contemplated in a political-
economy application of this framework that we do not pursue here. 
3   We could also include a real wage objective in the analysis, in which case a real-wage 
target would appear throughout all subsequent expressions, but none of the 
substantive implications would be affected. 
4  Thus, more open economies with centralized wage setting would benefit from greater 
central bank independence, which is consistent with the results derived by Eijffinger et 
al. (2000) using a more standard Barro-Gordon-style framework.   
5  For most of the countries in the sample, Kenworthy’s index of wage-setting 
coordination is not time-invariant.  This measure is constant for four countries in the 
sample (France, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland), but for the remaining thirteen 
countries the series has a standard deviation ranging from 0.43 (Finland) to 1.44 
(UK).   
6  The data in all three of these non-binary series are percentages expressed as whole 
numbers.   
  
                                                                                                                                                             
7  The nations we consider are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
8  The regression equations in Table 1 do not contain an intercept term, because our 
goal is to test the hypothesized humped-shape of the effect of coordination on 
inflation.  Doing so necessitates including all five categories of the wage-setting 
coordination index in the regression equation.  As a result, the usual coefficient of 
determination, R2 defined as the ratio of the explained sums of squares to the total 
sums of squares, is no longer valid.  Instead, one use the sum of squared predicted 
values divided by the sum of squared observed values of the dependent variable as a 
measure of goodness of fit of the estimated equation.  This ratio, adjusted for the 
number of degrees of freedom, is what is reported in Table 1. 
9  As an alternative approach, we crossed all possible permutations of the five dummy 
coordination variables with openness and CBI, which resulted in generally mixed 
results with no particularly discernable pattern. 
10 We replaced Franzese’s CBI index with the central bank turnover index (Ghosh et al. 
2002) and re-estimated all five models.  In all cases, including the broadest model in 
column 5 of Table 2, we found the hump-shaped pattern of wage-setting coordination 
though there was a loss of statistical significance for some of the estimates.  This 
means that the results may not be robust to the measure of central bank 
independence.   
11 It is important to note that interaction terms are inherently symmetrical in the sense 
that if the marginal effect of CBI on inflation depends on wage-setting coordination, 
then it must be that the marginal effect of coordination would in turn be a function of 
CBI.  Moreover, if the former effect is a diminishing function of coordination, then the 
latter effect would also be a declining function of CBI. 
 2
  
                                                                                                                                                             
12 We arrived at the same conclusion when we interacted the exchange rate regime 
variables with the other regressors in the model.  
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